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Lannert: Dueling Decisions

NOTE
Dueling Decisions: The Wrongful Death
Clock Clangs Twice on the Same Day
Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health System, Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703 (Mo. 2015) (en
banc).

STACEY ANN LANNERT*

I. INTRODUCTION
“Hard cases . . . are apt to introduce bad law.”1 This maxim concerning
hard cases is an apt description of what may be a first in the Supreme Court
of Missouri’s history: dueling decisions issued on the exact same day.2 On
August 18, 2015, the court issued contradictory opinions centered on the statutory interpretation of the wrongful death statute of limitations.3 Both cases
display polar opposite outcomes to the question of whether fraudulent concealment by tortious defendants defeats meritorious claims brought beyond a
three-year statute of limitations in wrongful death cases.
Two contradictory lines of reasoning have developed in Missouri
wrongful death causes of action.4 The clashing decisions demonstrate the
collision of strict interpretation and liberal construction and serve to illuminate the difficulty that dominates the issue. In Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health
Systems, Inc., the court applied strict construction interpretation standards to

*

B.S., Southeast Missouri State University, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2017. Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2016–
2017. I would like to sincerely thank Professor Brad Desnoyer for his assistance and
direction with this Note, Dean Robert Bailey for his guidance and encouragement,
and my friends and loved ones for their patience and support.
1. Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703, 713 (Mo. 2015)
(en banc) (citing Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch.)).
2. See id.; State ex rel. Beisly v. Perigo, 469 S.W.3d 434 (Mo. 2015) (en banc);
Rick Montgomery, Missouri Supreme Court Ruling Blocks Lawsuit Over Deaths at
Chillicothe Hospital, KAN. CITY STAR (Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.kansascity.com/
news/business/health-care/article32747469.html.
3. See generally Boland, 471 S.W.3d 703; Beisly, 469 S.W.3d 434.
4. Compare Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 708 (barring equitable estoppel in wrongful
death actions concerning defendant’s use of fraudulent concealment), and Frazee v.
Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Mo. 1958) (en banc) (finding that wrongful death
statutes do not provide for the tolling of statutes due to fraudulent concealment), with
Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 444 (allowing equitable estoppel to bar the defense of time
limitations), and O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.3d 904, 907–08 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)
(creating a liberal construction standard for wrongful death statutory interpretation).
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bar the plaintiffs from filing a wrongful death suit due to time limitations.5
Conversely, the court in Beisly v. Perigo applied a liberal construction standard and injected a judicially-created common law maxim, equitable estoppel,
to bar the defense of a statutory time limitation when the defendants engaged
in fraudulent concealment.6
Even though the contrary opinions were factually dissimilar,7 the hearts
of both cases beat identically in that the defendants allegedly employed intentional and fraudulent concealment of the facts, which made it impossible for
the plaintiffs to bring their respective wrongful death suits within the statute
of limitations. Both cases held that a cause of action for wrongful death was
a “purely” statutory creation.8 Both cases attempted to decipher the intent
and plain language of the legislature9 so as to untangle fraudulent concealment entwined in the hands of the wrongful death clock in order to properly
determine when time started or accrued10 and when time should freeze or
toll.11 Both cases were also closely decided by a 4-3 majority.12 However,
the Beisly decision was only made possible due to the recusal of a Supreme
Court of Missouri judge and the participation of a Special Judge from the
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District.13 For purposes of this
Note, Boland will be the focus.14
Part II of this Note provides the facts and holding in Boland. Part III
presents the legal background of Boland, discusses both the statutory and
common law origins of wrongful death causes of action, and explores Missouri’s unique history of wrongful death statutory interpretation. Part IV
analyzes the rationale of the Boland court’s return to the strict interpretation
standard of days past. Finally, Part V discusses the ramifications of the
5. 471 S.W.3d at 709.
6. 469 S.W.3d at 444.
7. Boland involved the alleged fraudulent acts of a hospital in an attempt to

conceal alleged intentional acts of an employee. 471 S.W.3d at 705. Beisly centered
on the murder of a woman allegedly killed by her husband and another man who hid
their involvement in the crime. 469 S.W.3d. at 436.
8. Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 455 (Russel, J., dissenting).
9. See id. at 445 (majority opinion); Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 707.
10. As stated by the court in Beisly, “[g]enerally, ‘[a] cause of action accrues . . .
when the right to sue arises.’” Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 437 (alteration in original)
(quoting Hunter v. Hunter, 237 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Mo. 1951)).
11. Tolling “occurs when a party shows facts that act to remove or interrupt the
bar of the statute of limitations to a cause of action.” Id. at 437 (citing 2 MO.
PRACTICE SERIES, Methods of Practice: Litigation Guide § 5.9 (4th ed. 2002)).
12. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 713; Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 445.
13. Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 445 (Fischer, J., dissenting). The Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Western District heard Boland. Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health Sys.,
Inc., No. WD75364, 2013 WL 6170598 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2013), aff’d, 471
S.W.3d 703.
14. The action in Beisly involved a writ of prohibition compared to a grant of
transfer found in Boland; therefore, Beisly presents the opportunity to reappear before
the court. See Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 446 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
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court’s decision and explores why the court should have acknowledged
wrongful death claims that ascended from common law.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Five people seeking treatment at a Chillicothe, Missouri hospital died in
2002.15 The family members alleged a rogue nurse16 employed by the hospital was responsible for the deaths.17 The nurse, Jennifer Hall,18 purportedly
dosed the patients with lethal amounts of unneeded medication19 and, therefore, caused the decedents’ deaths.20 A minimum of nine suspicious deaths
and eighteen suspicious “codes”21 were attributed to the nurse.22
Dr. Cal Greenlaw became suspicious when a patient in the emergency
room suddenly “coded” for cardiovascular collapse, and Dr. Greenlaw could
not explain “the patient’s unusual blood sugar/insulin events.”23 This event,
combined with Dr. Greenlaw’s knowledge of two previous suspicious incidents, led the doctor to voice concerns to the hospital administration –
twice.24 The doctor’s concerns were met with a denial of the problem, an
admonishment to remain silent, and a command to abandon the issue out of
fear this news would affect hospital enrollment.25 One hospital administrator
said, “We don’t have a problem here, and if anyone breathes a word of this,

15. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 705. The deceased were treated at Hedrick Medical
Center in Chillicothe, Missouri. Id.
16. Specifically, a respiratory therapist. Id.
17. Id.
18. Hall has an interesting background: she was convicted and later exonerated
of setting a fire at a previous place of employment. Rick Montgomery, Hospital
Deaths Cast a Shadow Over Jennifer Hall, KAN. CITY STAR (Aug. 28, 2015),
http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article32652306.html.
19. Specifically, succinylcholine, insulin, and/or other medication. Boland, 471
S.W.3d at 705, 720 n.2. Succinylcholine, a muscle relaxant that paralyzes the respiratory muscles, is usually used when inserting breathing tubes for conscious patients.
Id. Succinylcholine can be fatal when given in large doses, as the patient will suffocate to death due to paralysis. Id.
20. Id. at 705.
21. Codes are “medical emergencies, often involving cardiac arrest or the inability to breath.” Id.
22. Id. The respiratory therapist had not been officially charged as of August 28,
2015. Rick Montgomery, Missouri Supreme Court Ruling Blocks Lawsuit Over
Deaths at Chillicothe Hospital, KAN. CITY STAR (Aug. 29, 2015),
http://www.kansascity.com/news/business/health-care/article32747469.html.
23. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 706.
24. Id. On the first occasion, Dr. Greenlaw told the hospital’s director of nurses,
and on the second occasion, he told the hospital’s administrator. Id.
25. Id.
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you’ll be fired.”26 The doctor disregarded the administration and gathered
evidence that pointed to eighteen code blues and nine suspicious deaths that
occurred while the nurse was on duty.27 Dr. Greenlaw contacted local authorities.28
Aleta Boyd, a registered nurse and the hospital’s internal risk manager,
detected a “dramatic increase in code blue events and deaths” in March
2002.29 Boyd began an investigation after she suspected patients were intentionally injected with unnecessary insulin.30 Boyd determined Hall was the
perpetrator and reported the findings to both the director of nursing and the
hospital’s administrator.31 Similar to Dr. Greenlaw’s experiences, Boyd was
met with a directive to remain quiet. However, like Dr. Greenlaw, Boyd continued to investigate.32 Boyd uncovered “approximately 15 patients who either coded or died under suspicious circumstances,” and Hall attended to each
patient.33 Boyd and other concerned nurses threatened to alert the media if
the hospital “failed to stop Hall.”34
In May 2002, Hall was suspended and eventually fired after yet another
patient expired under suspicious conditions.35 A post-suspension investigation of Hall’s locker revealed a bottle of insulin, even though Hall could not
give a legitimate explanation for the insulin’s presence.36 After Hall’s termination, the suspicious codes and deaths stopped.37
An independent investigation was conducted by the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations and concluded a number of
“sentinel” events occurred during 2002.38 The Supreme Court of Missouri
defined a “sentinel” event as “an unexpected occurrence involving death or
serious physical or psychological injury, or the risk thereof.”39 Healthcare
providers must report notice of sentinel events to patients and their families.40
However, the families of the deceased reported they were not notified of the

26. Brief of Appellant Sherri Lynn Harper, as Spouse of Deceased David Harper
at 5, Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., No. WD 75366, 2013 WL 6170598
(Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2013) (No. WD 75366), 2013 WL 623705, at *5.
27. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 706.
28. Brief of Appellant Sherri Lynn Harper, supra note 26, at *5.
29. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 706.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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sentinel events suspected in connection with the deaths, despite the hospital’s
duty to do so, until shortly before their petitions were filed in 2010.41
The families filed separate petitions for damages under the wrongful
death statute, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 537.080.42 The hospital argued the claims were time-barred by Missouri Revised Statutes Section
537.100,43 the three-year wrongful death statute of limitations, and the hospital filed motions for judgment on the pleadings.44 The trial court granted
summary judgment for the hospital because the claims were filed eight years
after the deaths, five years past the statute of limitations.45
On joint appeal, the families of the deceased46 contended that the trial
court erred by granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of the hospital
because the wrongful death statute of limitations time-bar should not have
been applicable due to the hospital’s fraudulent concealment.47 The families
argued two main points concerning why the statute of limitations did not apply in this case; both points centered on the inability to ascertain a cause of
action for wrongful death because the families were unaware that tortious
conduct, instead of natural causes, contributed to the deaths.48 First, the families argued that the hospital’s fraudulent concealment49 stopped the clock or
41. Id. at 706–07. See Brief of Appellant Helen Pittman, Natural Sister of Decedent, Shirley R. Eller at 4, Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., No. WD 75366,
2013 WL 6170598 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2013) (No. WD75485), 2013 WL
1234150, at *4.
42. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (2000); Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 707.
43. § 537.100.
44. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 707.
45. Id.; see Brief of Appellant Helen Pittman, supra note 41, at *4.
46. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 705, 707–8. The families appealed, and the separate,
but “essentially identical,” appeals were consolidated. Id.
47. Substitute Brief of Appellants at 12, Boland, 471 S.W.3d 703 (Mo. 2015) (en
banc) (No. SC 93906), 2014 WL 3706773, at *12.
48. Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., No. WD75364, 2013 WL 6170598,
at *5 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2013), aff’d, 471 S.W.3d 703.
49. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 705–06. The families alleged the hospital fraudulently concealed Hall’s actions because it: (1) threatened and coerced employees of
Hedrick to conceal information concerning the actions of Hall; (2) failed to request
autopsies so as to conceal the true causes of the patients’ deaths when they knew a
number of deaths were suspicious; (3) informed and/or instructed Hedrick employees
to intentionally mislead the patients’ families that the causes of death were “natural”
instead of caused by Hall; (4) disbanded committees previously put in place by
Hedrick to evaluate “codes” and determine preventative measures; (5) failed to inform pertinent individuals and relevant medical communities about Hall’s intentional
and/or negligent battery of patients; (6) failed to investigate and/or monitor Hall when
requested to do so by law enforcement; (7) made patients’ medical records inaccessible to their physicians by removing the records; (8) discarded and/or failed to preserve crucial material evidence contained in Hall’s locker pertaining to her intentional
and/or negligent batteries; and (9) impeded the investigation of Hall by law enforcement. Id.
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“tolled” the statute of limitations.50 Second, the families argued that due to
fraudulent concealment, the cause of action for wrongful death did not accrue
at the time of death, but rather began when “the causes of death became evident or reasonably ascertainable.”51
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District reversed the
judgment on the pleadings and remanded for further proceedings.52 The appellate court reasoned “tolling” could not apply due to the legislature’s creation of a special time limitation.53 However, the court concluded that “accrual” could apply,54 because the legislature did not define “accrue,” and therefore, “accrual” was open for judicial interpretation.55 The court declined to
apply the strict interpretation standard, but rather applied liberal construction
as set forth by the Supreme Court of Missouri’s directive in O’Grady v.
Brown – that “in order to promote the purpose and objectives of the Wrongful
Death Act, the Act shall not be strictly construed.”56 The appellate court held
the legislative time limitation in Section 537.100 did not accrue until, by reasonable diligence, a cause of action for wrongful death could be ascertained.57
The Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer of this case.58 The
court affirmed the orders of the trial courts for judgment on the pleadings in
favor of the hospital.59 The court held that the wrongful death claim accrued
at the time of death, not eight years later when the cause of death was reasonably ascertained,60 and that common law maxims for fraudulent concealment,
such as equitable estoppel, were not appropriate to toll statutory time-bar
creations.61 The court further held that accrual should be interpreted under
the strict interpretation standard set forth in a case from 1952, Frazee v. Partney.62 The strict interpretation standard required the court to “construe the

50.
51.
52.
53.

Boland, 2013 WL 6170598, at *5.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. (“[T]he Wrongful Death Act contains its own special statute of limitations. We agree with Respondents on that point and do not apply those provisions, as
section 516.300 makes clear that the limitations contained within sections 516.010 to
516.370 do not extend to this action.”).
54. Id.
55. Id. (“Accrual is not defined within the Wrongful Death Act and, thus, is open
to interpretation by the courts.”).
56. Id. at *6 (citing O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)).
57. Id. at *10.
58. Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703, 703 (Mo. 2015)
(en banc).
59. Id. at 713.
60. Id. at 710; see Combined Substitute Brief of Respondents at 45, Boland, 471
S.W.3d 703 (No. SC 93906), 2014 WL 3706775, at *45.
61. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 710.
62. Id. at 705.
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cold, clear words of the statute” and refrain from judicial enlargement of the
time limitation set forth by the statute.63

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Missouri has applied two lines of interpretation to wrongful death causes of action. The standard used significantly impacts the outcome of the
wrongful death statute of limitations analysis. One line reflects the harshness
of the strict interpretation standard, while the liberal construction line alleviates the severity of possible injustices through the application of judiciallycreated common law maxims of estoppel.64 Because wrongful death causes
of action were first considered “a purely statutory creature”65 of the legislature, early courts strictly construed wrongful death statutes, which resulted in
harsh applications of the statute of limitations.66 However, when a court
acknowledges that wrongful death causes of action existed at common law, it
may depart from strict interpretation and apply a liberal construction standard.67 Statutes interpreted liberally gain the availability of common law maxims to prevent injustice and allow courts to appreciate the moral and ethical
issues surrounding the statute.68 Missouri has consistently held that wrongful
death causes of action are a statutory creation that did not exist at common
law,69 but has fluctuated between which standard to apply – strict interpretation or liberal construction.70

63. Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915, 921 (Mo. 1958).
64. Gregory E. Maggs, Estoppel and Textualism, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 167, 167

(2006).
65. State ex rel. Beisly v. Perigo, 469 S.W.3d 434, 455 (Mo. 2015) (en banc)
(Russel, J., dissenting).
66. See Mary C. Doesburg, Note, Wrongful Death Statute-Limitation of ActionsPeriod within which Beneficiary Must Sue Still Strictly Construed, 42 MO. L. REV.
496, 500 (1977).
67. See LaFage v. Jani, 766 A.2d 1066, 1077 (N.J 2001).
68. See id. at 1076–80.
69. See, e.g., O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.3d 904, 907 (Mo. 1983) (en banc);
State ex rel. Kan. City Stock Yards Co. of Me. v. Clark, 536 S.W.2d 142, 144 (Mo.
1976) (en banc); Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Mo. 1958); Coover v.
Moore, 31 Mo. 574, 574 (1862).
70. Compare Boland v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703, 705 (barring equitable estoppel in wrongful death actions concerning defendant’s use of
fraudulent concealment), and Frazee, 314 S.W.2d at 919 (finding that wrongful death
statutes did not provide for the tolling of statutes due to fraudulent concealment), with
Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 441 (allowing equitable estoppel to bar the defense of time
limitations), and O’Grady, 654 S.W.3d at 911 (creating a liberal construction standard for wrongful death statutory interpretation).
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A. Statutory Creation
The traditional rule, that a cause of action for wrongful death is purely a
statutory creation and has no roots in common law, can be traced back to
1808 in the English case of Baker v. Bolton.71 In dictum, and without cited
authority or supported reasoning, Lord Ellenborough created “Baker’s Rule,”
which stated, “[i]n a civil court, the death of a human being could not be
complained of as an injury.”72 The English remedied the absence of a wrongful death cause of action with legislation.73 The Fatal Accidents Act of 1846,
more commonly known as Lord Campbell’s Act,74 provided “a distinct remedy for wrongful death in favor of designated members of the deceased’s family.”75 The preamble of this Act reflected the drafters belief that no common
law precedent for wrongful death existed.76
71. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 382–83 (1970) (citing
Baker v. Bolton (1808) 170 Eng. Rep. 1033); see Dennis M. Doiron, A Better Interpretation of the Wrongful Death Act, 43 ME. L. REV. 449, 453 (1991); Daniel J.
Scheffner, Taking Wrongful Death Seriously: Dworkinian Interpretivism and the
Common Law Right of Action for Wrongful Death, 5 FAULKNER L. REV. 223, 224
(2014).
72. Glick v. Ballentine Produce Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609, 614 (Mo. 1965) (quoting
Baker, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033), overruled on other grounds by Bennett v. OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp., 896 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. 1995) (en banc).
It must be remembered that Baker v. Bolton was a nisi prius case, tried in the
local court before a single judge rather than en banc in the superior court at
Westminster. The case involved only a small amount of money and apparently was not extensively argued. Ellenborough’s reported opinion is very brief,
and the controversial rule of law was laid down without either sustaining reasoning or supporting authority.

Appellants’ Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal at 3, Glick, 396 S.W.2d
609 (Mo. 1965) (No. 51298), 1966 WL 100819, at *3 (quoting TA Smedley, Wrongful Death: Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605, 614–615 (1960)).
73. Steven H. Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions and Section 1983, 60 IND. L.J.
559, 572–73 (1985).
74. Id. at 572.
75. Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043,
1058 (1965).
76. Id. There is some debate that Baker’s Rule sprang from penal felony murder.
See id. at 1055; LaFage v. Jani, 766 A.2d 1066, 1076–77 (N.J. 2001) (citing F.
POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS 52–57 (Landon ed. 1951); W. Holdsworth, The Origin of
the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q. REV. 431 (1916)).
Under the felony-merger doctrine, no civil recovery was permitted under the
common law for an act that constituted both a tort and a felony. The felony
was against the Crown and was deemed more serious than the tort, and thus
the tort was merged into, or pre-empted by, the felony.

Id. at 1077.
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A few American jurisdictions, including Missouri,77 recognized common law wrongful death causes of action in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries.78 However, the common law wheels of wrongful death
jurisprudence ground to an abrupt halt when American courts first adopted
Baker’s Rule in Carey v. Berkshire Railroad Co. in 1848.79 In Carey, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts applied Baker’s Rule to a wrongful
death action and denied relief to a widow in the negligent death case of her
husband, a railroad employee.80
The Supreme Court of the United States, in The Harrisburg, later cited
Carey,81 and various state courts followed.82 As a result, American state legislatures passed wrongful death statutes to alleviate the harshness of no recovery.83 Today, all fifty states have statutes for recovery under wrongful
death causes of action.84
The Missouri legislature enacted the state’s first wrongful death statute
in 1855.85 Consequently, when Missouri courts applied the wrongful death
statute, they considered the action to be substantive law86 and construed the
statute strictly.87 Strict interpretation mandates that judicial construal is
“bound to consider only the plain language . . . and the legislative intent that
language evidenced.”88 Additionally, when reading and applying the statute,
77. See James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162, 164 (1853).
78. See, e.g., Gross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90, 90 (Conn. 1794); Ford v. Monroe, 20

Wend. 210 (N.Y. 1838).
79. Carey v. Berkshire R.R. Co., 55 Mass. 475, 478 (1848), overruled in part by
Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1972); see Doesburg, supra note 66, at
497.
80. Carey, 55 Mass. at 475. See Doiron, supra note 71, at 454.
81. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), overruled by Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
82. See Doiron, supra note 71, at 453–54.
83. See, e.g., Steinglass, supra note 73, at 573; Jonathan James, Comment, Denial of Recovery to Nonresident Beneficiaries Under Washington’s Wrongful Death and
Survival Statutes: Is It Really Cheaper to Kill A Man Than to Maim Him?, 29
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 663, 667 (2006).
84. See James, supra note 83, at 666–67.
85. MO. REV. STAT. § 3, p. 648 (1855) (current version at MO. REV. STAT. §
537.080–.090 (2000)); see 5A JOHN A. BORRON, JR., MO. PRAC., PROBATE LAW &
PRACTICE § 852 (3d ed.).
86. Coover v. Moore, 31 Mo. 574, 574 (1862). In Coover, the Supreme Court of
Missouri held that wrongful death was “purely a statutory right” and a common law
cause of action did not exist for the “negligent killing of another.” Id. Coover also
stated, “Penal statutes must be strictly construed.” Id.
87. Cummins v. Kan. City Pub. Serv. Co., 66 S.W.2d 920, 925 (Mo. 1933); see
also Michael T. Kokal, Note, Rambo I: The Missouri Supreme Court vs. the Wrongful
Death Statute—Prelude to the Sequel?, 57 MO. L. REV. 321, 322–23 (1992) (discussing strict interpretation of wrongful death causes of action).
88. Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703, 709 (Mo. 2015)
(en banc); see Maggs, supra note 64, at 167.
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judicial analysis should not be influenced by policy arguments89 and judges
should not “take it upon themselves to find exceptions, glosses, or creative
interpretations of the plain meaning of statutes”90 – even when the conclusion
reached is “distasteful.”91
An excellent example of Missouri’s strict interpretation standard can be
found in the 1958 Supreme Court of Missouri case Frazee v. Partney.92 In
Frazee, a sleepy truck driver ran a car off the road and killed two of the car’s
passengers, a mother and daughter.93 The truck driver failed to report the
accident.94 The victims’ family filed a wrongful death cause of action once
the identity of the driver became known; however, the suit commenced past
the one-year statute of limitations due to the fraudulent concealment of the
defendant’s identity.95 The Frazee court held that the wrongful death statute
did not provide for the tolling of the statute of limitations due to fraud or concealment and that a wrongful death cause of action accrued at death.96

B. Discovering Common Law Origins
Other jurisdictions have analyzed the historical bedrocks of wrongful
death causes of action and acknowledged that codification originated at
common law before statutory creation.97 Missouri, however, has consistently
held fast that wrongful death causes of action sprang from statutory creation
rather than common law.
Missouri first confronted the idea of common law origination for wrongful death actions in 1965 in Glik v. Ballentine Produce, Inc.98 The Supreme
Court of Missouri addressed statutory criticism and defended Lord Campbell’s Act because it was “accepted as a parliamentary recognition of the preexisting rule” and created a model for all ensuing statutory rights of wrongful

89. Maggs, supra note 64, at 167.
90. Id.
91. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 711 (quoting Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308,

314 (Mo. 1968) (en banc)).
92. See 314 S.W.2d 915, 921 (Mo. 1958).
93. Id. at 917.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 921.
97. LaFage v. Jani, 766 A.2d 1066, 1076–80 (N.J. 2001). New Jersey is one of
the more recent jurisdictions to recognize that wrongful death claims originated
through common law and overrule all past cases that held wrongful death was a statutory creation. Id. at 1079; see, e.g., William S. Bailey, Flawed Justice: Limitation of
Parental Remedies for the Loss of Consortium of Adult Children, 27 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 941, 953 (2004).
98. Glick v. Ballentine Produce Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1965), overruled on
other grounds by Bennett v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 896 S.W.2d 464 (Mo.
1995) (en banc).
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death recovery in Missouri.99 The court vehemently declined to overturn the
long held view of statutory wrongful death based on “the scattered voices of
protest and criticism.”100 The court firmly held, “There is no common law
right of action for wrongful death in Missouri.”101 This early confrontation
assisted in Missouri’s rejection of common law origination for wrongful
death claims found five years later in other jurisdictions.102
Cracks in the theory of wrongful death statutory creation began in 1970
after the Supreme Court of the United States decided Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.103 In Moragne, the Court evaluated historical applications of
actions for wrongful death and determined the traditional justification for
Baker’s Rule “never existed in this country.”104 The Court specifically overruled its holding in The Harrisburg, which established the precedent for
wrongful death actions not found under common law.105
Following Moragne, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts overruled Carey, the case that laid the foundation for Baker’s Rule in America.106
In Gaudette v. Webb, the court held the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’s
wrongful death recovery right originated at common law.107 Gaudette explicitly barred the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense because interpreting wrongful death statutes through the lens of common law allowed the
general application of limitations, instead of merely specific limitations.108
By allowing a general application, the court held that, when appropriate, the
limitations could be tolled.109
The Supreme Court of Missouri had the opportunity to change course
and acknowledge common law origins in 1976 through Kansas City Stock
Yards Co. of Maine v. Clark.110 In Kansas City Stock Yards, the court considered an untimely filing of a wrongful death claim and held fast to the ap-

99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 614.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 402–03
(1970); Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Mass. 1972); LaFage, 766 A.2d at
1076–80.
103. 398 U.S. 375.
104. Id. at 381.
105. Id. at 409 (1970). Although both Moragne and The Harrisburg dealt with
maritime law, the Court ascertained the common law applicable on land also applied
on sea. State ex rel. Kan. City Stock Yards Co. of Me. v. Clark, 536 S.W.2d 142, 153
(Mo. 1976) (en banc) (Bardgett, J., dissenting).
106. Kan. City Stock Yards, 536 S.W.2d at 154.
107. 284 N.E.2d 222, 229. The court found that even if wrongful death causes of
action began in statutory creation, wrongful death causes of action now “evolved to
the point” that they should be considered common law. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 536 S.W.2d 142.
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plication of strict interpretation and statutory creation precedent.111 The court
reasoned the Missouri legislature’s 1967 amendment of the wrongful death
statute could have provided inclusions that would alter the limitations.112
In his dissent in Kansas City Stock Yards, Judge Bardgett looked back to
a case decided in 1853, James v. Christy, which planted Missouri’s common
law seeds two years prior to statutory creation.113 After a thorough historical
analysis, Judge Bardgett concluded that the origin of a wrongful death claim
was “firmly rooted” in common law.114
In James, the Supreme Court of Missouri established that a father could
sue the party responsible for the negligent death of his son.115 The court further held the father could recover both non-pecuniary and non-economic
damages “for the loss of society or comforts” of his son.116 The Supreme
Court of the United States cited James as one of the early American “common-law courts against the [Baker] rule.”117

C. Missouri’s Liberal Interpretation Standard
In 1983, the Supreme Court of Missouri finally changed course, rejected
strict interpretation, and applied a liberal interpretation standard to a wrongful
death cause of action in O’Grady v. Brown.118 The court held a stillborn, yet
viable, fetus was considered a “person” under the wrongful death statute.119
The opinion was written by Special Judge James A. Pudlowski,120 who held
that the statute was intended to “mend the fabric of the common law” and
promote the “apparent object of the legislative enactment.”121 The court set
out three objectives of the statute: “(1) ‘to provide compensation to bereaved
111. Id. at 150 (Bardgett, J., dissenting) “The principal opinion does not say in so
many words that the Missouri wrongful death act must be strictly construed because it
created a right of action nonexistent at common law, yet, that is the theory that pervades many of the earlier cases cited therein.” Id.
112. The amendment occurred three years prior to Moragne. See id. at 144;
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
113. See Kan. City Stock Yards, 536 S.W.2d at 151 (Badgett, J., dissenting) (citing
James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162 (1853)); BORRON, supra note 85.
114. See Kan. City Stock Yards, 536 S.W.2d at 153 (Badgett, J., dissenting).
115. James, 18 Mo. at 164. In James, the father perished before the adjudication
of his case and an administrator pursued the cause of action after his demise; the court
allowed the recovery of the son’s death to be passed to the administrator. Id. See
Daniel J. Sheffner, Wrongful Death’s Common Law Antecedents in Missouri, 70 J.
MO. B. 194, 196 (2014).
116. Sheffner, supra note 115, at 196 (quoting James, 18 Mo. at 164).
117. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 205 (1886), overruled by Moragne, 398 U.S.
375.
118. 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
119. Id. at 906–07.
120. Id. at 906. Supreme Court of Missouri Judge Welliver did not sit on this
case. Id. at 912.
121. Id. at 908.
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plaintiffs for their loss,’ (2) ‘to ensure that tortfeasors pay for the consequences of their actions,’ and (3) ‘to deter harmful conduct which might lead
to death.’”122 The O’Grady court, however, stopped short of accepting common law origination for wrongful death causes of action.123
In Beisly v. Perigo, through a 4-3 majority opinion written by Judge
George W. Draper, III, and decided with the assistance of a Special Judge, the
Supreme Court of Missouri jumped the precedential hurdle of Frazee v. Partney by distinguishing Beisly from it.124 The court held Frazee remained good
law but was distinguished from this case because, in order to uphold the objectives created in O’Grady, fraudulent concealment blocked a defendant’s
application of an affirmative defense based on time expiration.125
Belinda Beisly was found dead in her home due to gunshot wounds on
July 15, 2009.126 The State filed charges against her husband, Bob Beisly,
and Jeremy Maples on February 13, 2013.127 Belinda’s mother brought a
wrongful death claim after the three-year statute of limitations period and
argued the statute of limitations should not be enforced due to fraudulent
concealment.128 In this case, the husband purportedly hid his involvement in
Belinda’s murder after another man, Maples, killed her.129 The husband
claimed a home invasion occurred, lied to police, destroyed evidence, and
denied involvement in Belinda’s death.130
The court focused on the common law maxim that “fraud vitiates whatever it touches”131 as a fundamental tenet that has allowed estoppel to prevent
an affirmative defense of the statute of limitations when arising from fraud.132
The court reasoned the shield of estoppel neither tolled nor created an exception to the statute of limitations; estoppel simply prevented the murderer from
122. State ex rel. Beisly v. Perigo, 469 S.W.3d. 434, 439 (Mo. 2015) (en banc)
(quoting O’Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 909).
123. O’Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 908.
124. Ironically, Judge Draper wrote the dissent in Boland. Boland v. St. Luke’s
Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d. 703, 703 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). Atypically, O’Grady
was also decided with the assistance of a Special Judge. O’Grady, 654 S.W.2d at
906. Supreme Court of Missouri Judge Welliver did not sit on this case. Id. at 912.
125. Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 440.
126. Id. at 447.
127. Id. Maples was charged with first-degree murder. Id. at 436. Beisly was
charged with aiding and encouraging Maples. Id. Charges against Beisly were eventually dropped. Jeff Lehr, Husband’s Charge Dropped in Vernon County Murder
Case,
JOPLIN
GLOBE
(Mar.
19,
2015),
http://www.joplinglobe.com/news/local_news/husband-s-charge-dropped-in-vernoncounty-murder-case/article_d3cb8199-c033-5efe-b27d-1df52d7dfb6f.html.
128. Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 446.
129. Id. at 447.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 442 (quoting Cox v. Upjohn Co., 913 S.W.2d 225, 231 (Tex. Ct. App.
1995)).
132. Id.
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using the time limitation as a defense.133 This analysis allowed the court to
remain within its constitutional bounds by not creating an exception to a legislatively created statute of limitations.134 The court then applied Missouri
Revised Statutes Section 1.010,135 the common law reception statute, in an
effort to liberally construe and interweave O’Grady’s instruction136 into the
legislature’s intent.137 The court reasoned that Section 1.010 provides, “all
acts of the general assembly, or laws, shall be liberally construed, so as to
effectuate the true intent and meaning thereof,” and therefore, equitable estoppel should be “interweaved” in order to foil fraudulent concealment.138
Beisly provided two dissenting opinions. The first discussed why the
court should not have decided this case in a manner that contradicted the decision reached on the very same day in Boland.139 Judge Zel M. Fischer admonished the Beisly plurality for reaching a 4-3 majority decision only with
the assistance of a Special Judge in light of the full “regular” court’s decision
in Boland.140 In addition, Judge Fischer reasoned Beisly should not have
been decided at all because it only appeared before the court on a writ of prohibition while Boland reached the court through a direct appeal.141 Beisly
will now return to the trial court without clear direction; the trial judge must
decide whether to apply Beisly or Boland.142 Judge Mary Rhodes Russell
penned the second dissenting opinion; she authored the majority opinion in
Boland.143

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that the common law maxim of equitable estoppel did not bar the defendant’s defense of
time limitation when the defendant’s fraudulent acts concealed the tortious
133. Id.
134. Id. at 444. The Separation of Powers provision is provided by the Missouri

Constitution, Article II, Section I. Id. at 443.
135. MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.010 (West 2016). “Section 1.010 expressly provides
that ‘all acts of the general assembly, or laws, shall be liberally construed, so as to
effectuate the true intent and meaning thereof.’” Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 444 (quoting §
1.010.1).
136. O’Grady instructed courts “to perceive the import of major legislative innovations and to interweave the new legislative policies with the inherited body of
common law principles.” Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 444 (quoting O’Grady v. Brown, 654
S.W.2d 904, 908 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)).
137. Id. at 444.
138. Id. (quoting § 1.010.1).
139. Id. at 445–46 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 446.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 445; Boland v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703, 704–05
(Mo. 2015) (en banc).
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nature of the deaths.144 The court further held that accrual for wrongful death
claims began the instant the decedent died as opposed to the moment the
cause of action was discovered.145

A. The Majority Opinion
The court declined to follow the more recent, liberal interpretation crafted in O’Grady v. Brown146 and relied on a case from 1952, Frazee v. Partney,147 to determine that accrual for a wrongful death statute began at the
moment of death and that statutory interpretation should be strictly construed.148
The Boland court addressed the issue of delayed accrual and looked to
the analysis in Frazee to determine when time limitations began to run.149
The court had to determine if accrual began at the moment of death or at the
point the lawsuit could be “effectively commenced.”150 The court rejected
O’Grady’s holding that “the wrongful death statute was not in derogation of
the common law and should be construed ‘with a view to promoting the apparent object of the legislative enactment.’”151 The court reasoned O’Grady
did not analyze the statute of limitations and because Frazee did, Frazee remained controlling precedent.152 Like in Frazee, the Boland court held that
“despite the harshness of the outcome, the wrongful death claim accrued at
the moment of death.”153
The Boland court then looked at the application of estoppel to bar the
defendants the defense of time due to fraudulent concealment.154 The court
reasoned estoppel application equated to a “de facto exception to section
537.100 for fraudulent concealment.”155 The court noted the tragic circumstances of Boland created a compelling policy argument, but that a “freewheeling” method to statutory interpretation “[was] also troubling,” especially when precedent advised a contrary outcome.156 The Boland court again
turned to Frazee for analysis of statutory interpretation.157
The Boland court noted Section 537.100, the statute of limitations for
wrongful death, contained a “special statute of limitation” that “must carry its
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Boland, 471 S.W.3d. at 712–13.
Id. at 710.
654 S.W.3d 904, 911–12 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958).
Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 708–09.
Id. at 708.
Id. (citing Frazee, 314 S.W.2d at 917).
Id. at 709 (quoting O’Grady, 654 S.W.3d at 908).
Id. at 715 (Draper, J., dissenting).
Id. at 708–09 (majority opinion) (citing Frazee, 314 S.W.2d at 921).
Id. at 710.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 711.
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own exceptions and [the court] may not engraft others upon it.”158 Section
537.100 creates a specific time limitation for two reasons,159 neither of which
allows exceptions for fraudulent concealment. Chapter 516 is the general
statutes of limitations chapter and does carry a fraudulent concealment exception in Missouri Revised Statutes Section 516.280.160 The court stated, “The
principles of the legislative deference as well as stare decisis must be respected.”161 Like in Frazee, the court held in Boland that a general exception was
not applicable when a special exception was present.162
The court then analyzed the legislative intent behind the wrongful death
statutory scheme.163 The court also noted the presumption of legislative action in light of “full awareness and complete knowledge of the present state
of the law.”164 The court reasoned the legislature could have created a fraudulent concealment exception in light of Frazee but instead chose to expand
the limitation period twice.165 The court held, “Our function is to interpret
the law; it is not to disregard the law as written by the General Assembly.”166

B. The Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Draper, joined by Judge Stith and Judge Teitelman,
concurred with the majority’s holding that Frazee remained valid precedent.167 The dissent agreed the cause of action for wrongful death accrued at
the decedent’s death168 and that Section 537.100169 lacked an overt tolling
exception in connection with a tortfeasor’s fraudulent concealment.170
Judge Draper stated the majority erred by not applying the doctrine of
equitable estoppel to bar the hospital from using the statute of limitations as

158. Id. (quoting Frazee, 314 S.W.2d at 919).
159. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.100 (2000). This statute defines limitation periods

and details the two special limitations; one is a tolling provision for defendants who
abscond from the state to avoid service, and the other is a one-year savings provision
if the Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer after opinion by the court of appeals in accordance with MO. CONST. art. V, § 10.
160. MO. REV. STAT. § 516.280 (2000).
161. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 711.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 712–13.
164. Id. at 713 (quoting State v. Rumble, 680 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Mo. 1984) (en
banc)).
165. Id. The legislature expanded the wrongful death time limitation “first from
one year to two years in 1967, then to three years in 1979.” Id.
166. Id. at 711 (quoting Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308, 314 (Mo. 1968)
(en banc)).
167. Id. at 713 (Draper, J., dissenting).
168. Id.
169. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.100 (2000).
170. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 713 (Draper, J., dissenting).
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an affirmative defense, as found in the reasoning of Beisly.171 The dissent
contended that the precedent of strict interpretation applied in Frazee should
not be followed; rather, stare decisis demanded that the objectives created in
O’Grady be allowed to construe the limitations liberally.172 By applying
Section 1.010, the court could interweave the common law maxims of equitable estoppel as a shield to bar the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations due to the defendant’s fraudulent concealment.173
Finally, the dissent argued the application of equitable estoppel did not
engraft a “‘de facto exception’ onto section 537.100” because it did not affect
accrual at death for wrongful death claims or toll the statute of limitations.174
The dissent contended the principal opinion’s interpretation of the statute
“[led] to an illogical and absurd result” because fraudulent concealment allows tortfeasors to escape liability.175

V. COMMENT
The Supreme Court of Missouri should recognize that the legislature did
not originate the field of wrongful death recovery by the passage of the
Wrongful Death Act in 1855.176 In both cases, Boland and Beisly, the Supreme Court of Missouri should have ruled in favor of wrongful death’s
common law existence for two reasons: precedent and legislative intent. Because Missouri does not recognize common law existence in wrongful death
cases, lower courts are now trapped between two contradictory decisions
without clear precedential guidance. Until the dueling decisions are reconciled or one is overruled, lower courts are left in limbo and must choose between the strict and narrow or liberal and broad. The recognition and application of common law would provide judicial stability, flexibility, and strong
direction for future wrongful death causes of action.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 713–14.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 718.
Id. at 719.
Id.
See James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162, 162 (1853).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 11

600

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

A. Precedent
For the past sixty years, two distinct lines of reasoning have surfaced: a
defendant-friendly line and a plaintiff-friendly line.177 The defendantfriendly line, reflected in Boland, is based on the use of strict interpretation
and focuses on the “plain language of the legislature.” Regardless of the reason for bringing suit past the legislatively determined time limit, courts must
strictly interpret the statute of limitations.178 This strict interpretation line
outright bars claims brought beyond the three-year statute of limitations created by the legislature. Strict interpretation seeks only to extract the objective
meaning behind legislative intent.179
The plaintiff-friendly line, reflected in Beisly, is based on liberal construction standards180 and considers both policy issues and common law maxims of equity that allow estoppel to bar the statute of limitations defense
when necessary.181 This line, therefore, focuses on unearthing the subjective
reasoning behind the late filing of a wrongful death claim and prevents injustice.182
Both the Boland and Beisly courts relied on precedent to determine the
proper standard of interpretation. The Boland court recognized that Frazee v.
Partney, a case from over half a century ago, remained good law. 183 Notably, Frazee was decided before the critical shift toward the application of
common law existence in wrongful death claims.184 Frazee followed a line of
cases that strictly interpreted the application of the statute of limitations to
wrongful death claims because the statute was theoretically created solely by
legislation.185 The strict interpretation standard served as a restraint on the
court’s ability to apply common law maxims to extended statutory deadlines
and prevent injustice.186 On the other hand, Beisly relied on modern prece-

177. Compare Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 713–14 (barring the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel in wrongful death actions concerning defendant’s use of
fraudulent concealment), and Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915, 915 (Mo. 1958)
(finding that wrongful death statutes do not provide for the tolling of statutes due to
fraudulent concealment), with State ex rel. Beisly v. Perigo, 469 S.W.3d 434, 436
(Mo. 2015) (en banc) (allowing the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar the defense
of time limitations), and O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.3d 904 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)
(creating a liberal construction standard for wrongful death causes of action).
178. See Maggs, supra note 64, at 167.
179. Id.
180. Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 443–44.
181. See Maggs, supra note 64, at 167–68.
182. Id. at 172.
183. Boland v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703, 708–09 (Mo. 2015)
(en banc) (citing Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958)).
184. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 408–09 (1970).
185. See Doiron, supra note 71, at 457–58.
186. See id. at 453.
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dent, the case of O’Grady v. Brown.187 O’Grady applied a liberal interpretation standard in construing a wrongful death cause of action; this allowed the
court analytical flexibility.188
Neither court, Boland nor Beisly, overruled Frazee as they should have.
Frazee’s strict interpretation standard directly conflicts with the liberal construction standard of O’Grady. The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District reasoned that O’Grady overruled Frazee sub silentio.189 However, both the Boland and Beisly courts held that Frazee remained good law.190
The Supreme Court of Missouri “is presumed not to be overruled sub silentio,” and since O’Grady did not expressly overrule Frazee, the case remained
good law.191 Both courts distinguished O’Grady from Frazee because the
statutes of limitations were not at issue in O’Grady.192
Technically, the Boland court, despite the harshness, came to the correct
conclusion through a strict interpretation analysis because Frazee cannot remain good law in the presence of a liberal interpretation analysis. The Beisly
court’s liberal construction must fall if Frazee remains good law. Frazee
requires the court to disregard intentional acts of fraudulent concealment by a
defendant when the statute of limitations surpasses the time limit created by
the legislature. However, finding common law existence in wrongful death
claims would overrule Frazee because the “underpinning for the English
rule”193 would be condemned. Common law application would open the door
for stare decisis to follow O’Grady’s liberal construction standards and allow
the court to apply judicially-created common law maxims when justice demands.

B. Legislative Interpretation
Legislative intent is the key to interpreting complex statutes.194 In interpreting the wrongful death statute, courts should remember that the purpose
of the statute is to provide compensation for the loss of companionship and
support from a loved one who would be alive if not for the defendants’ ac-

187. State ex rel. Beisly v. Perigo, 469 S.W.3d 434, 439–40 (Mo. 2015) (en banc)
(citing O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)).
188. O’Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 904.
189. Boland v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703, 709; Beisly, 469
S.W.3d at 440. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “sub silentio” as, “Under silence;
without notice being taken; without being expressly mentioned.” Sub Silentio,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
190. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 709; Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 440.
191. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 709.
192. Id.; Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 440.
193. LaFage v. Jani, 766 A.2d 1066, 1076–80 (N.J. 2001).
194. Michael Sinclair, “Only A Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’s “Dueling
Canons,” One to Seven, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 919, 923 (2006).
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tions.195 Boland’s decision did not uphold the purpose of the wrongful death
act, but the Beisly decision did.
The Boland court relied on imperfect reasoning to support legislative intent. The Boland court determined the legislature could have created a fraudulent concealment exception in light of Frazee but instead chose to expand
the limitation period.196 Three reasons disturb this analysis: the timing of the
legislative amendments, the presumption of legislative awareness, and the
liberal interpretation standard provided by O’Grady.
First, the legislature’s initial amendment to the wrongful death statute
occurred fifteen years after the court decided Frazee.197 Second, the court
noted the presumption of legislative action in light of “full awareness and
complete knowledge of the present state of the law.”198 Under this reasoning,
the legislature would need to be aware of a single case, Frazee. Commentators have pointed out that it is illogical to assume that legislature takes notice
of every single ruling, and the legislative presumption may be outdated due to
the proliferation of judicial decisions.199 In addition, it is highly unlikely the
small handful of plaintiffs denied wrongful death claims would lobby the
legislature for change.200 Lastly, even if the legislature had been aware of
Frazee, the O’Grady decision in 1983 would have caused legislative confusion because O’Grady would have trumped strict interpretation standards and
allowed a liberal construction to apply common law maxims, such as equitable estoppel, to alleviate the harsh injustice of impossible time limitations.
Boland frustrates the very purpose of the wrongful death statute. According to Boland, defendants can hide facts surrounding their actions for
three years plus one day and never be held accountable for a wrongful death
claim through civil proceedings. Judge Cardozo once stressed there was a
need to protect the rights of an innocent yet tardy plaintiff.201 The court cannot rectify the deterrence and compensatory purpose of the wrongful death
statute by allowing tortfeasors to escape liability when they hide tortious conduct or evidence.
The Beisly court upheld the purpose of the statute but engrafted an exception onto the wrongful death statute of limitations. Beisly relied on equitable estoppel to bar the defendant from escaping liability.202 A basic com-

195. O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (citing MO.
REV. STAT. § 537.090).
196. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 713. In Boland, the court noted that subsequent to
Frazee, the General Assembly twice amended Section 537.100. Id. “[F]irst from one
year to two years in 1967, then to three years in 1979.” Id.
197. Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958).
198. Boland, 471 S.W.3d at 713 (quoting State v. Rumble, 680 S.W.2d 939, 942
(Mo. 1984) (en banc)).
199. See, e.g., Kokal, supra note 87, at 338 & n.153.
200. Doesburg, supra note 66, at 505.
201. Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 541 (1915).
202. State ex rel. Beisly v. Perigo, 469 S.W.3d 434, 440 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
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mon law maxim is that no person should benefit from fraud.203 This maxim
is “deeply rooted in this country’s jurisprudence and older than the country
itself.”204 Equitable estoppel is a judicial creation for obliterating injustice. 205
Equitable estoppel prevents a defendant from using the statute of limitations
as an affirmative defense to a claim when fraudulent concealment occurs.206
It is only invoked when a defendant intentionally takes active steps to camouflage tortious conduct.207
The Beisly court reasoned the shield of estoppel did not toll or create an
exception to the statute of limitations; estoppel simply barred time limitation
as a defense.208 This reasoning presumably allowed the court to remain within Missouri’s constitutional bounds209 by applying Section 1.010210 to “interweave” equitable estoppel in order to foil fraudulent concealment.211 However, the equitable estoppel distinction is “a distinction without a real difference”212 and does engraft an exception onto the statute that skates past legitimate restrictions.213 For that reason, Beisly must once again fail.
Statutes of limitations are imperfect.214 They are “artificial constraints”
used to restrict a party’s time to sue.215 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once
asked, “[W]hat is the justification for depriving a man of his rights, a pure
evil as far as it goes, in consequence of the lapse of time?”216 The function of
a statute of limitations is protection for the defendant against stale claims,217
whereas the function of a wrongful death statute is compensation, accountability, and deterrence. Statutes of limitations promote injustice when applied
severely.218
Acknowledgement that wrongful death claims originated through common law and were not created entirely through legislation would allow the
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courts to apply estoppel in order to alleviate the harshness and injustice of an
arbitrary time limitation and remain within constitutional bounds. The “genius of our common law” has been in creating “ways to provide a remedy for
the wrongs that afflict us.”219 Following the example of Massachusetts’s
Gaudette v. Webb,220 common law beginnings would allow a firmer foundation for the court to apply the general exception for fraudulent concealment
found in Section 516.280.221 Common law roots allow the courts to consider
the general, rather than special, statute of limitations222 because the limitation
period would become procedural rather than substantive.223 The limitation
should be suspended or disregarded when conditions or circumstances justify
expanding a time limitation.224 Therefore, defendants should not be allowed
to use time limitations as a defense against a wrongful death cause of action
when they hide actions that cause the death of a loved one.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Missouri must act with swiftness and remedy the
disharmony created by the dueling decisions. In order to uphold the objectives created in O’Grady and to prevent injustice, the court should follow the
path unveiled by other jurisdictions and acknowledge that wrongful death
claims originated in common law.225 Missouri’s common law roots of
wrongful death causes of action predate the legislative creation of the wrongful death statute and create a stronger basis supporting a liberal interpretation
than currently provided by Beisly.226
Boland’s return to the strict interpretation standard moves Missouri back
in time,227 disregards the central compensatory purpose behind the statute,228
and provides escape from liability by fraudulently concealing tortious conduct.229 Courts should not lightly overrule decades of precedent, but the burden of wrongful death time limitation reform has clearly fallen upon this
court. Hard cases make bad law,230 but they do not have to. The impact of
this bad law should be limited by the court through uncovering Missouri’s
common law origins in wrongful death causes of action.
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